In hermeneutics, understanding and interpretation are closely related and their structure is circular or spiral. The interpretation of a text takes place in this circular movement. The interpreter`s anticipation of the text, which means something, says something understandable, is the attitude he has at the beginning of the interpreting process. This anticipation of meaning includes the step into the hermeneutical circle. The interpreter is only able to understand the meaning of a text because he has prerequisites about what the text means. But this anticipation is only the step in the circle. Once in the process, the interpreter`s biases are replaced by new biases as the interpretation evolves. This vision of interpretation emphasizes the relationship between the parts and the whole. We can only understand the whole by understanding its parts, but the whole also determines the meaning of the parts. The reciprocal movement from part to part is a basic structure of interpretation, and the performer`s job is to create meaning for the whole. The harmony of the parts and the whole is a criterion for a successful understanding. Hermeneutics is one of the great schools of philosophical thought of the twentieth century. Philosophical hermeneutics has its roots in Heidegger`s philosophy, but the central work is Gadamer`s Truth and Method, published in German in 1960.
Gadamer is primarily interested in human understanding. It develops the hermeneutic circle described by Heidegger.1 The idea in its simplicity is that to understand something, we must already understand something. But when all understanding depends on prior understanding, we are trapped in a circle. A work of art has something to tell us: it commands us something; It demands a response. He is a kind of sovereign who can give us orders. We see this in Gadamer`s insistence that we are open to the text and its unique meaning; This is a small leap, almost no step at all towards the requirement of responsible interpretation. Openness is not limited to mere neutrality, but requires a more active attitude on the part of the performer. The sovereign authority of the work is also a call for responsible responses and dialogue (cf. Derrida 2004, 6). The interpreter has a responsibility towards the work, a responsibility from which he cannot escape. In general, hermeneutics is the art of textual interpretation and comes from the analysis of religious texts. However, its application extended to the legal, philosophical and even literary.
According to Eco, the way to examine the intent of a text involves looking at the text as a coherent whole. The internal coherence of the text, its own structure, controls an otherwise uncontrollable reader (Eco 1992:65). The interpretations of the different parts of the text must fit together. However, this still leaves a lot of things open. Admittedly, there are examples of consistent interpretations of texts that we still could not consider as good interpretations. A functional interpretation is based on the features of the text on which a coherent whole can be constructed, but this means that some other features are simultaneously considered secondary or irrelevant (see Eco 1992:144-146). The interpreter therefore has great power over the meaning of a text. We have now examined some features of Gadamer`s hermeneutics from which a particular view of interpretation began to develop.
Some preliminary remarks on the ethical elements contained in the agreement and on the responsibility of the interpreter were outlined. It is necessary to think more deeply about these ideas so that we can see what this approach really entails and, more importantly, what such an approach could bring us, if we take into account the particular requirements of legal interpretation. Legal hermeneutics This is the method used in the interpretation of legal texts. Legal hermeneutics creates the conceptual foundations for the analysis of legal norms to be as accurate as possible. Eco distinguishes between the interpretation and use of texts. A text can be used for many things: it can be parodied, used as inspiration or as a sleep aid. Interpretation means respecting the cultural and linguistic context of the text (Eco 1992:69). To use a text is to exploit it for personal, political or ideological purposes. The interpretation, on the other hand, respects the text itself. In a way, Eco places this respect on the semantic meaning of the utterances that make up the text.4 When a text is used, its semantic meanings are not respected and the interpreter reads it as he wishes.
It seems to identify partially erroneous interpretations with use. He recognizes, however, that there is always an element of utility in interpretation and that these two types of encounter with texts cannot always be clearly separated (cf. Eco 1990: 57-58, 62). A reader often uses and interprets text while reading at the same time. A look at language is described in the chapters above, but many difficult questions remain. How can we say that a court decision is based on a text? How do we decide what the text means and what it commands? Thanks to the linguistic knowledge of Wittgenstein and Derrida, we are now better equipped to answer these questions. But these theories contain nothing that can anchor meaning for the purposes of a theory of legal interpretation. It is necessary to broaden the field of research from the philosophy of language to interpretation and understanding at a more general level. In this way, we can better understand the difficult issues of legal interpretation.
Therefore, after the rather narrow discussion about language and meaning, the question of interpretation now needs to be clarified. We can already see that it is inevitable to study interpreting as an activity and not just language as a system in order to be able to answer all the questions about legal interpretation. When you focus on interpretive activity, the interconnectedness of meaning, and life choices, people become more visible in different circumstances. Interpretation is always made by someone at a certain time and place. This chapter examines Hans-Georg Gadamer`s interpretation in hermeneutics and UmbertoEco`s semiotics. We can then turn to Derrida`s deconstruction, which involves a critique of hermeneutics. Being open to a text that is a prerequisite for understanding is like talking to it. Therefore, the only way for an interpreter is to understand the text, listen to it and try to understand what it means. For Gadamer, this dialogic structure is what makes the hermeneutic experience universal. Language is a conversation always and everywhere: “Speech is what one says and the other understands” (Gadamer 1989b: 95). This universality means that language, meaning and interpretation are based on dialogue and interpersonal understanding, which creates a basis for hermeneutics at a deep level (cf.
Gadamer 2006b:35). Hermeneutics is a general basis of any understanding as well as a context from which a variety of scientific disciplines can be constructed. A text can, of course, use a language different from ours. According to Gadamer, we generally notice a use of language that differs from our own, in that a text does not seem to convey meaning or the meaning is not compatible with what we expected. It is not that the reader can consider any meaning as the meaning of a text. He or she has presuppositions about meaning and at the same time waits for the text to mean something – he or she rarely waits for it to mean nothing or nothing. We have the right to assume that, except in exceptional circumstances, a person who speaks the same language as us speaks it in the same intelligible way as we do (Gadamer 1979: 237-238). With regard to the autonomy of legal texts, we find it very difficult to specify the identity of the text, including the beginning and the end. This was also evident earlier in the discussion of the pragmatics of legal language. A striking feature of legal texts is their intertextuality. They usually refer both explicitly and implicitly to other texts. Legal texts can rarely be considered independent or complete works; On the contrary, they are like pieces of a puzzle.
But to some extent, this applies to all texts. Moreover, because of this intertextual nature, as well as the purposes and situations in which they are written and read, legal texts do not only speak to us. They refer not only to other texts, but also to earlier interpretations of themselves and other texts. We do not need to know everything that the legal text has undergone in order to be able to interpret it legally, but we do need to know a lot. Nevertheless, it could be argued that certain common characteristics link the interpretation of a legal text and the interpretation of a work of art. The text of the law, like the work of art, has a life independent of its author. Legal interpretation must remain open to the meaning of the text itself, and not only to what the author or authors may have intended to say. However, the importance of the first stage of interpretation, during which the text is assigned to a specific group of texts, should not be underestimated. The process of interpretation in law is of a special nature.
